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TORTS-FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF STATE
COMMON LAW-FEDERAL CIGARETTE
LABELING AND ADVERTISING ACT
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,
112 S. Ct. 2608 (1992).
After forty-two years of smoking, Rose Cipollone, age fifty-eight,
died of lung cancer.' Approximately one year prior to her death,
Mrs. Cipollone and her husband Antonio 2 filed a diversity complaint
in the Federal District Court for the District of New Jersey3 against
three cigarette manufacturers, 4 alleging Mrs. Cipollone's injuries were
caused by smoking and asserting theories of strict liability, breach
of express warranty, negligence, and intentional tort. 5 All three
defendants defended the action on grounds, inter alia, that the
Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act 6 [hereinafter the 1965
Act] preempted all of the plaintiff's common law claims. 7

1. Mrs. Cipollone began smoking in 1942, at the age of sixteen, Cipollone
v. Liggett Group, Inc., 893 F.2d 541, 548 (3d Cir. 1990), and died on October 21,
1984. Id. at 551.
2. After Mr. Cipollone's death in January 1990, the Cipollone's son, Thomas,
continued the suit as executor of his parent's estate. Petition for Writ of Certiorari,
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 6.1 TOBACCO PRODUCTS LITIG. REP. 3.1, 3.2; see

also Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608, 2614 (1992).
3. The original complaint was filed on August 1, 1983. Cipollone, 893 F.2d
at 552.
4. The manufacturers are: Liggett & Myers, manufacturer of Chesterfield
and L & M cigarettes, which Mrs. Cipollone smoked from 1942 to 1968, Brief for
Petitioner, Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc. (No. 90-1038), 6. IB TOBACCO PRODUCTS
LITIG. REP. (TPLR, Inc.), 3.37, 3.48-3.49 (U.S. 1990); Philip Morris, manufacturer
of Virginia Slims and Parliament brands, which Mrs. Cipollone smoked from 1968
to 1974, Cipollone, 893 F.2d at 551; and Lorillard, Inc., manufacturer of True
brand, to which Mrs. Cipollone switched in 1974 on the recommendation of her
doctor who, unsuccessful in his efforts to get Mrs. Cipollone to quit, considered
the True brand safer because it was advertised as "low tar." Id.
5. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 593 F. Supp. 1146, 1149 (D.N.J. 1984).
6. Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79
Stat. 282 (1965) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (1988)). The 1965 Act
required the following warning label to be affixed to every package of cigarettes:
"Caution: Cigarette Smoking May be Hazardous to Your Health." 15 U.S.C. §
1333 (1970).
The Act was amended in 1969 to require a new warning: "Warning: The
Surgeon General Has Determined that Cigarette Smoking is Dangerous to Your
Health." 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (1976).
The Act was again amended in 1984 to provide that the following four warnings
were to be used on a rotating basis:
SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Smoking Causes Lung Cancer, Heart
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The plaintiff moved to strike the federal preemption defense. 8
Defendant Loew's Theatres, Inc. (Lorillard) moved for judgment on
the pleadings. 9 The district court held that the federal law did not
preempt any of the plaintiff's claims, thereby granting plaintiff's
motion to strike and denying defendant's motion for judgment on
the pleadings.' 0
The district court granted permission to make interlocutory appeal"
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit on the
issue of federal preemption. The Third Circuit reversed, holding that
"the Act preempts those state law damage actions relating to smoking
and health that challenge either the adequacy of the warning on
cigarette packages or the propriety of a party's actions with respect
to the advertising and promotion of cigarettes." 2 The Third Circuit
further held that any of plaintiff's claims that "necessarily depend
on the assertion that a party bore the duty to provide a warning to
consumers in addition to the warning Congress required ....
were
preempted as conflicting with the federal law. 3
Confronted with this cryptic mandate, the district court, on
remand, determined that the Third Circuit holding necessitated
preemption of plaintiff's post-1965 fraudulent misrepresentation,
express warranty, conspiracy to defraud, and negligent and strict
liability failure to warn claims.' 4 However, plaintiff's pre-1966 and
post-1965 claims based upon defective design, 5 negligent testing

Disease, Emphysema, and May Complicate Pregnancy.
SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Quitting Smoking Now Greatly
Reduces Serious Risks to Your Health.
SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Smoking By Pregnant Women May
Result in Fetal Injury, Premature Birth, and Low Birth Weight.
SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Cigarette Smoke Contains Carbon
Monoxide.
15 U.S.C. § 1331 (a)(l) (1988).
Mrs. Cipollone quit smoking sometime in 1983, approximately two years following her lung cancer diagnosis. Cipollone, 893 F.2d at 551. Therefore, the adequacy
of the warnings provided by the 1984 Amendments were not in issue in the litigation.
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181, 184 (3d Cir. 1986).
7. Cipollone, 593 F. Supp. at 1149.
8.

Id.

9.

Id. Motion for judgment on the pleadings was made pursuant to Fed.

R. Civ. P. 12(c).
10. Id. at 1171.
11. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1988).
12. Cipollone, 789 F.2d at 187.
13. Id.

14. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 664, 675 (D.N.J. 1986).
15. To the extent that the plaintiff wished to proceed under a risk/utility
theory of defective design, as opposed to a consumer expectations analysis, the
plaintiff's claim was not preempted. Id. at 670-71. In a subsequent ruling, however,
the district court determined that, based upon the New Jersey Products Liability
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and research, 6 and intentional interference with third parties' decisions to publish smoking research data 7 survived the preemptive
blade.
Following a four-month trial, a jury awarded the plaintiff
$400,0001'-the first award ever obtained in a tobacco liability case'9 based upon a finding that Defendant Liggett had breached express
warranties contained in pre-1966 advertisements. 20 Both parties ap2
pealed this judgment. '
The court of appeals set aside the verdict and remanded for a
new trial on various issues.Y Ironically, Chief Judge Gibbons, in a
concurring opinion, announced his belief that the Third Circuit's

Act, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:58C (West 1986), no action could lie against a cigarette
manufacturer based upon an unreasonably dangerous design defect theory as a
matter of law. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., No. 83-2864, 1987 U.S.Dist. LEXIS
9936 (D.N.J. Oct. 27, 1987). The Third Circuit later reversed this ruling, on grounds
that there was insufficient evidence to conclude that an ordinary consumer would
have known of the inherently hazardous propensities of cigarettes. Cipollone, 893
F.2d at 578. This question was thus considered appropriate for the jury. Id.
16. Cipollone, 649 F. Supp. at 672-73. New Jersey case law recognized a
distinct duty to adequately conduct testing and research. Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, 479 A.2d 374 (N.J. 1984). Because this duty is independent of the duty
to adequately warn, the district court held that it did not conflict with the federal
law. Cipollone, 649 F. Supp. at 673.
17. Id. at 674. The district court reasoned that if the defendant acted to
prevent third parties from publishing information about the dangers of smoking,
such action would not constitute a "promotion" activity within the meaning of the
federal law's preemption provision. Id. See also 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (1988).
18. Cipollone, 893 F.2d at 555. Interestingly, the $400,000 award was compensation for Mr. Cipollone. Under New Jersey's 50/50 comparative negligence law,
the jury's finding that Mrs. Cipollone was 8006 responsible for her injuries precluded
recovery for her estate. Id. at 554-55.
19. "Smoker's Survivors Drop Landmark Suit," Cm. TRm., November 6,
1992, at p. 4 .
20. The $400,000 award was based upon pre-1966 advertisements because the
district court had determined that express warranty claims based upon advertisements
after the effective date of the Act (January 1, 1966) were preempted. Cipollone,
649 F. Supp. at 675.
21. Cipollone, 893 F.2d at 555. The defendants appealed on grounds that
various jury instructions were erroneous. The plaintiffs appealed, inter alia, the
denial of prejudgment interest and the trial court's allowance of consideration of
Mrs. Cipollone's post-1965 behavior for purposes of assessing comparative fault.
Id.
22. Issues to be resolved on remand included: the merits of plaintiff's riskutility design defect claim; whether Mrs. Cipollone had heard, read, or seen the
advertisements in issue; whether Mrs. Cipollone had believed the safety assurances
in defendant's advertisements; how much prejudgment interest plaintiff was entitled;
and when plaintiff discovered facts giving rise to her claim for purposes of the
statute of limitations. Cipollone, 893 F.2d at 583. In addition, the circuit court
determined that the district court erred in permitting the jury to consider Mrs.
Cipollone's post-1965 conduct in assigning comparative fault pursuant to the New
Jersey Comparative Fault Act, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:15-5.1 (West 1986). Id. at 559.
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earlier preemption ruling "was wrong as a matter of law, and should
be overruled by the court en banc. "23 Plaintiff's petition for rehearing
en banc was denied. 2 4
Plaintiff then petitioned for and was granted a writ of certiorari
by the United States Supreme Court, 25 seeking final determination
of the preemptive scope of the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act. 26 On certiorari to the United States Supreme Court,
held, reversed in part and affirmed in part. The Federal Cigarette
Labeling and Advertising Act preempts state common law claims
based upon post-1968 failure to warn (negligent or strict liability) if
based on advertising or promotion; however, the Act does not
preempt claims based upon design or manufacturing defects, fraudulent misrepresentation or conspiracy to misrepresent, express warranty, negligent research or testing (if not based on advertising or
promotion), or pre-1969 failure to warn. 27 Cipollone v. Liggett Group,
Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608 (1992).
Effective January 1, 1966, the Federal Cigarette Labeling and
Advertising Act 2 required cigarette manufacturers to affix to every
package of cigarettes the following message: "Caution: Cigarette
Smoking May Be Hazardous to Your Health." 29 The purpose of the
federal law was two-fold: 1) to adequately inform the public about
the dangers of cigarette smoking, and 2) to protect commerce and
the national economy by preventing states from imposing non-uniform and confusing labeling and advertising regulations. 0

23.
24.

Id. at 583.
Plaintiff's petition for rehearing was denied on August 30, 1990. Petition

for Writ of Certiorari, Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 6.1
LITIG. REP. 3.1.

TOBACCO PRODUCTS

25. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1386 (1991).
26. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-40 (1988).
27. The effective date of the preemption section of the 1969 Act is July 1,
1969. Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222, 84 Stat.
87, 90 (1970). Four Justices, Stevens, Rehnquist, White, and O'Connor, would
preempt negligent testing claims only if such claims were based upon a defendant's
advertising or promotion. Cipollone, 112 S.Ct. at 2622. Three Justices, Blackmun,
Kennedy, and Souter, believed the federal law did not preempt any design defect
claims. Id. at 2631-32.
28. Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79
Stat. 282.
29. 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (1970).
30. 15 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988). The full text of the Declaration of Policy is as
follows:
DECLARATION OF POLICY
Sec. 2. It is the policy of the Congress, and the purpose of this chapter,
to establish a comprehensive Federal Program to deal with cigarette labeling
and advertising with respect to any relationship between smoking and health
whereby-
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In order to fulfill the latter of the two purposes, the 1965 Act
contained a section entitled "Preemption" that provided:
(a) No statement relating to smoking and health, other than the
statement required by Section 431 of this Act, shall be required on
any cigarette package;
(b) No statement relating to smoking and health shall be required
in the advertising of any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled
in conformity with the provisions of this Act. 2
In 1969, with the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) considering
tough new warnings for cigarette advertisements33 and the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) proposing to ban cigarette ads
on radio and television,3 4 Congress passed the Public Health Cigarette
Smoking Act of 196935 [hereinafter the 1969 Act]. The 1969 Act
required a new, tougher statement on each package of cigarettes:
"Warning: The Surgeon General Has Determined that Cigarette
Smoking is Dangerous to Your Health.1 3 6 In addition, the 1969 Act
amended subsection (b) of the 1965 Act's preemption section to read
as follows: "(b) No requirement or prohibition based on smoking or
health shall be imposed under State law with respect to advertising
or promotion of cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in
' 37
conformity with the provisions of this Act.
Thus, three significant changes were made to subsection (b) of
the preemption section. First, the word "statement" was replaced
with the broader phrase, "requirement or prohibition." Second, the
phrase "relating to" was replaced with "based on." Third, the phrase
(1) the public may be adequately informed that cigarette smoking may be
hazardous to health by inclusion of a warning to that effect on each
package of cigarettes; and
(2) commerce and the national economy may be (A) protected to the
maximum extent consistent with this declared policy and (B) not impeded
by diverse, non-uniform, and confusing cigarette labeling and advertising
regulations with respect to any relationship between smoking and health.
Id.
31. Section 4 was codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (1970).
32. Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282 (1965) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§
1331-1340 (1988)).
33. See 34 Fed. Reg. 7917 (1969). Notice that the 1965 Act did not require
the cautionary statement to appear in cigarette advertisements, but only on cigarette
packages. The FTC's 1969 proposal was a revitalization of a 1964 proposal that
many believe was the impetus for passage of the 1965 Act. The proposed warning
read as follows: "CAUTION-CIGARETTE SMOKING IS A HEALTH HAZARD.
The Surgeon General's Advisory Committee on Smoking and Health has found that
cigarette smoking contributes substantially to mortality from certain specific diseases
and to overall death rates." See 29 Fed. Reg. 8324 (1964); 29 Fed. Reg. 530 (1964).
34. See 34 Fed. Reg. 1959 (1969).
35. Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222, 84
Stat. 87 (1970) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1331-40 (1976)).
36. 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (1976).
37. 15 U.S.C. § 1334 (1976).
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"required in the advertising" was replaced with "imposed under
State law with respect to advertising or promotion." Subsection (a)
of the Act's preemption section was conspicuously left untouched. 8
Precisely what Congress intended these changes (or lack thereof) to
mean is, essentially, what all the fuss has been about.
To fully understand the debate, a brief overview of preemption
doctrine is necessary. The doctrine of preemption is the offspring of
Article VI, clause 2 of the Constitution, the so-called "Supremacy
Clause." 3 9 While the Supremacy Clause declares federal laws supreme,
the United States Supreme Court has proclaimed that federal laws
should be presumed not to displace authority traditionally left to the
' 41
states4° unless such intent is "clear and manifest."
Congressional intent to preempt can be either express or implied.4 2
When a federal statute containing a plain statement explicitly provides
for preemption, courts will presume that Congress intended to preempt; 43 the scope of such preemption is the only remaining question.4
If, however, Congress is silent on the issue of preemption, courts
may imply preemption in two circumstances: (1) when the federal
law is so pervasive or the federal interest so compelling that it can

38. Subsection (a) reads as follows: "(a) No Statement relating to smoking
and health, other than the statement required by Section 4 of this Act, shall be
required on any cigarette package." 15 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (1988).
39. "[Tlhe Laws of the United States .. .shall be the supreme Law of the
Land ... any Thing in the ... Law of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."

U.S. Const. Art. VI, cl.2.
40. Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981). With regard to health
and safety matters, which have traditionally been the province of the states, the
Supreme Court has explicitly stated that there is a "presumption that state or local
regulation of matters relating to health and safety is not invalidated under the
Supremacy Clause . . . [T]he regulation of health and safety matters is primarily,
and historically, a matter of local concern." Hillsborough County, Fla. v. Automated
Medical Laboratories, Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 708 (1985).
41. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); see also
Florida Lime and Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963) (intent to
preempt must be "unmistakeable" such that "the nature of the regulated subject
matter permits no other conclusion.").
42. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 95 (1983); Fidelity Sav. &
Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 152-53 (1982); Jones v. Rath Packing
Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977).
43. See Greogry v. Ashcroft, 111 S.Ct. 2395, 2404 (1991) (express preemption
"must be plain to anyone reading the Act"); California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v.
Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 282 (1987) (no need to infer congressional intent to preempt
if express language provides therefor); Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497,
505 (1978) (explicit preemption language provides reliable indicium of intent to
preempt).
44. Seven Justices in Cipollone agreed that once express preemption is found,
the only remaining question for the court is the intended scope of the preemptive
language. Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2618 (plurality opinion); Cipollone, 112 S. Ct.
at 2625 (concurrence in part, dissent in part).
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be said Congress intended to "occupy the field" to the exclusion of
the states,45 or (2) when state law would "actually conflict" with the
federal law.4
The first case to explicitly address the issue of the Federal
Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act was Banzhaf v. FCC7 In
Banzhaf, numerous broadcasters and the Tobacco Institute" challenged an FCC order requiring all radio and television stations that
accepted cigarette advertisements to also devote substantial air time
to anti-cigarette messages. 49 The challengers claimed the 1965 Act
preempted the FCC's authority to issue such ruling.5 0 The Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit rejected the preemption
argument, reasoning that preemption would require a finding that
"Congress legislated to curtail the potential flow of information lest
the public learn too much about the hazards of smoking for the
good of the tobacco industry and the economy."'"
The Banzhof court believed the 1965 Act was "aimed at the
relatively narrow specific issue" of regulating cigarette labeling and
advertising,5 2 and that while Congress may have decided the federal
warning to be adequate, there was no compelling evidence that
Congress believed the warning alone provided adequate information
to the public." Accordingly, the District of Columbia Circuit held
that the 1965 Act did not preempt the authority4 of the FCC to
require broadcasters to air anti-cigarette messages.
45. See Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, 373 U.S. at 146; Rice, 331 U.S.
at 230.
46. English v. General Elec., 110 S. Ct. 2270, 2275 (1990); Pacific Gas &
Elec. Co. v. Energy Resources Conservation and Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 204
(1982); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
"Actual conflict" preemption occurs in two situations: (1) where it is "physically
impossible" to comply with both state and federal law, or 2) where the state law
would obstruct achievement of the full purposes of the federal law. Maryland v.
Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 747 (1981); Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, 373 U.S.
at 142-43; see also Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Corp. v. State Oil & Gas Bd. of
Miss., 474 U.S. 409 (1986) (state gas pipeline was impliedly preempted because it
undermined purposes of Natural Gas Policy Act); McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228
U.S. 115 (1913) (state syrup labeling law held impliedly preempted because it made
compliance with Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act physically impossible).
47. 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied 396 U.S. 842 (1969).
48. The Tobacco Institute is a tobacco industry trade association founded in
1958 to lobby federal, state, and local governments. Brief for Petitioner, Cipollone
v. Liggett Group, Inc. (No. 90-1038), 6.1B TOBACCO PRODUCTS LrrIG. REP. (TPLR,
Inc.) 3.37, 3.73 (U.S. 1990).
49. Banzhaf, 405 F.2d at 1085.
50. Id. at 1087.
51. Id. at 1089.
52.

Id.

53.. Id. at
hoped to impede
all the facts, too
54. Id. at

1090. "[Wle find no sufficiently persuasive evidence that Congress
the flow of adequate information for fear that, if the public knew
many of them would stop smoking." Id.
1091.
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Close on the heels of the Banzhaf decision was the passage of
the 1969 Act and its corresponding change in the preemption language
relating to advertising and promotion." Thus, cases arising after the
passage of the 1969 Act were governed by the 1969 Act's broader
preemption language, thereby limiting the precedential value of the
Banzhaf decision. Indeed, it is the preemption language of the 1969
Act-not the 1965 Act-that has spawned so much confusion and
disagreement.
The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
was the first court to address the preemptive scope of the 1969 Act,
in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.16 After concluding that the 1969
Act did not expressly preempt state tort claims,5 7 the court analyzed
whether Congress intended to implicitly preempt such claims. After
a thorough review of legislative history, the district court rejected
implied preemption on three grounds: (1) while Congress admittedly
intended to "occupy the field," the field was limited to labelling and
advertising and did not extend to state common law, particularly in
the absence of alternate federal remedies,5" (2) no actual conflict
based upon "physical impossibility" existed because the 1969 Act
did not proscribe the imposition or use of additional warnings,5 9 and
(3) no actual conflict based on obstruction of purpose could be found
because imposing liability upon manufacturers would actually serve
to further the Act's stated purpose of adequately informing the
public of the hazards of smoking.60
This district court opinion was the first crack in the cigarette
manufacturers' previously impenetrable armor. 6' Momentum was

55. The 1969 Act amended subsection (b) of the preemption provision to
read as follows, "(b) No requirement or prohibition based on smoking or health

shall be imposed under State law with respect to advertising or promotion of any
cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in conformity with the provisions of
this Act."

Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, 84 Stat. 87, 87 (1970)

(codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-40).
56.
57.
58.
251 (1984)

593 F. Supp. at 1154.
Id.
Id. at 1163-64. Accord, Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238,
(Atomic Energy Act did not preempt award of punitive damages under

state law even though the Act provided for exclusive federal regulation of nuclear
safety because "lilt is difficult to believe that Congress would, without comment,
remove all means of judicial recourse for those injured by illegal conduct." Id. at
251).
59. Cipollone, 593 F. Supp. at 1166-68.
60. Id. at 1169.
61. The district court decision in Cipollone was the first litigated loss for
cigarette manufacturers. While many plaintiffs had brought products liability claims
before, none had recovered. See, e.g., Green v. American Tobacco Co., 409 F.2d
1166 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 911 (1970); Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers
Tobacco Co., 350 F.2d 479 (3d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 987 (1966); Ross
v. Philip Morris Co., 328 F.2d 3 (8th Cir. 1964); Largique v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
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stalled, however, when the cigarette manufacturers garnered a victory
on the preemption issue in the District Court for the Eastern District
of Tennessee in Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 62 which

held that continued viability of the state failure to warn claims would
be incompatible with congressional intent to provide uniform labeling. 63 Thus, when permission for interlocutory appeal was granted in
Cipollone, national focus quickly shifted to the Third Circuit as the
next important battleground on preemption.
In April 1986, the Third Circuit issued its decision, holding that
the 1969 Act preempted all state common law actions "relating to
smoking and health that challenge either the adequacy of the warning
on cigarette packages or the propriety of a party's actions with
respect to advertising and promotion of cigarettes." ' On remand,
the district court reluctantly concluded that the Third Circuit's holding required preemption of plaintiff's post-1965
intentional tort,
65
express warranty, and failure to warn claims.
Other circuit courts quickly followed the Third Circuit's lead. In
Stephen v. American Brands, Inc., 66 the Eleventh Circuit held that
the lower court had properly denied the plaintiff's motion to strike
67
preemption as an affirmative defense to his failure to warn claim.
The First Circuit, in Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc.,6 reversed the
district court's determination 69 of no preemption, on grounds that
permitting state common law suits would excessively disrupt the
delicate "balance of purposes" set forth by Congress. 70 According
to the First Circuit, the exposure of cigarette manufacturers to
common law liability would frustrate the stated purpose of protecting
commerce, thereby impermissibly tipping the balance of purposes in
favor of adequately informing the public.7 1
The Palmer court's articulation of a "balance of purposes" test
for identifying actual conflict and implied preemption of common
Co., 317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 865 (1963); R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co. v. Hudson, 314 F.2d 776 (5th Cir. 1963); Cooper v. R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co., 234 F.2d 170 (1st Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 875 (1958);
Albright v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 350 F. Supp. 341 (W.D. Pa. 1972), aff'd
485 F.2d 678 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied 416 U.S. 951 (1974); Fine v. Philip Morris,
Inc., 239 F. Supp. 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Mitchell v. American Tobacco Co., 183
F. Supp. 406 (M.D. Pa. 1960).
62. 623 F. Supp. 1189 (E.D. Tenn. 1985), aff'd, 849 F.2d 230 (6th Cir.
1988).
63. Id. at 1190-91.
64. Cipollone, 789 F.2d at 187.
65. Cipollone, 649 F. Supp. at 675.
66. 825 F.2d 312 (lth Cir. 1987).
67. Id. at 313.
68. 825 F.2d 620 (1st Cir. 1987).
69. Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 693 F. Supp. 1171 (D. Mass. 1986).
70. Palmer, 825 F.2d at 626.
71. Id. See also Cipollone, 789 F.2d at 187 (The Third Circuit stated that
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law claims was soon adopted by the Fifth 72 ind Sixth 73 Circuits,
the
7

Minnesota Supreme Court,7 4 and numerous lower courts. 1
It should be noted, however, that courts that have embraced the
"balance of purposes" test have restricted the scope of implied
preemption to failure to warn claims. Design defect, 76 misrepresentation, 77 and breach of warranty 78 have generally been held viable
claims beyond the reach of preemption.
With the First, Third, Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits in
agreement that the federal law preempted common law failure to
warn claims, the issue appeared to be, in judicial parlance, well
settled. But in July 1990 the Supreme Court of New Jersey, in Dewey
v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 79 cut against this considerable weight
of authority and provided the cigarette industry a stunning blow: it
held that the federal law did not preempt any common law causes
of action. 80 The Dewey court rejected the notion that actual conflict
"[t]he Act represents a carefully drawn balance between the purposes of warning
the public of the hazards of cigarette smoking and protecting the interests of [the]
national economy.").
72. Pennington v. Vistron Corp., 876 F.2d 414 (5th Cir. 1989). The Pennington court determined that "[a] state court jury verdict concluding that the
warnings selected by Congress do not sufficiently protect the citizens of a state from
the risks of smoking would clearly upset this carefully balanced federal scheme."
73. Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 849 F.2d 230, 234-35 (6th Cir.
1988) (state common law failure to warn claims impliedly preempted as actually
conflicting with the 1965 Act's delicate balance of purposes).
74. Forster v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 437 N.W.2d 655, 658 (Minn.
1989) (any state claims based upon adequacy or effect of cigarette advertising or
promotion impliedly preempted as actually conflicting with federal law's stated
purpose of balancing protection of health and commerce).
75. See, e.g., Rosers v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 557 N.E.2d 1045, 1051
(Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (post-1965 failure to warn claim impliedly preempted because
allowing the claim would thwart purpose of promoting labeling uniformity); Hite
v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 578 A.2d 417, 419 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (claims
based on adequacy of warning or advertising and promotion impliedly preempted
because allowing the claims would upset balance of purposes); Phillips v. R.J.
Reynolds Industries, Inc., 769 S.W.2d 488, 490 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988) (failure to
warn claim impliedly preempted under Palmer court's balance of purposes analysis),
appeal denied, 1989 Tenn. LEXIS 219 (Tenn. 1989).
76. See Rogers, 557 N.E.2d at 1051 (negligent and strict liability design defect
claims "do not thwart the Act's purpose of promoting uniformity"); Hite, 578 A.2d
at 420 (design defect claim not preempted because not based on adequacy of
warnings or advertising and promotion); Forster, 437 N.W.2d 661 (defective design
claim not preempted if unrelated to adequacy of warning).
77. See Forster,437 N.W.2d at 661-62 (misrepresentation claim not preempted
because any conflict with federal warning is "indirect and self-imposed" by manufacturer. But cf. Kotler v. American Tobacco Co., 926 F.2d 1217, 1223 (1st Cir.
1990) (intentional misrepresentation claim preempted under Palmer holding), vacated,
112 S. Ct. 3019 (1992); Rogers, 557 N.E.2d at 1055 (fraud claim held preempted
because based on manufacturer's advertising and promotion).
78. See Forster, 437 N.W.2d at 662 (breach of express and implied warranty
claims not preempted if unrelated to duty to warn).
79. Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 577 A.2d 1239, 1251 (N.J. 1990).
80. Id. at 1251.
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preemption could be found using the "balance of purposes" test. 8'
Noting that legislative history revealed the Act's "principal purpose"
to be informing the public,8 2 and that permitting common law recovery would further such purpose, the New Jersey Supreme Court
reasoned that any resulting impairment of the Act's "secondary"
purpose-protection of commerce-would be incidental. 3 The Dewey
court also emphasized that permitting state tort claims served another
purpose that Congress could not reasonably have intended to foreclose: compensating victims injured by harmful products. 84 Invoking
the strong presumption against preemption, the Dewey court concluded that if Congress had intended to leave those injured by
cigarettes without a remedy, "it knew how to do so with unmistakeable specificity." 85
The renegade decision in Dewey inspired imitation by the Texas
Court of Appeals in Carlisle v. Philip Morris, Inc.8 6 In a feisty
opinion that labeled the federal circuit court of appeals reasoning
"flawed,1 8 7 the Carlisle court concurred with the Dewey court's
determination that the primary purpose of the federal law was to
inform the public of the hazards of smoking. 88 Thus, permitting
common law recovery would further this overarching purpose,8 9 not
frustrate any perceived "balance of purposes." Other significant
factors weighing against preemption included an absence of alternate
remedies, a paucity of legislative history indicating intent to preempt,
and the existence of a savings clause in a subsequent law regulating
9
smokeless tobacco. 0
It was against this backdrop of bitter disagreement between state
courts and federal circuit courts that the United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari in the Cipollone case.
The Cipollone decision represents an uneasy compromise between
states clamoring to retain the right to adjudicate common law claims

81.
82.

Id. at 1258.
Id. at 1248 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 449, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted

in 1965 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 2350); accord Comment, Inadequate
Warning Claims Preempted by Cigarette Labeling Act: Palmer v. Liggett Group,
Inc., 34 Loy. L. REv. 419, 430 (1988).
83. Dewey, 577 A.2d at 1248-49.

84. Id. at 1249.
85. Id. at 1251.
86.

805 S.W.2d 498 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991).

87.
88.
89.
90.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 515.
at 509-11.
at 509.
The Comprehensive Smokeless Tobacco Health Education Act of

1986, Pub. L. No. 99-252, 100 Stat. 30, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 4401-4408 (1988),

contained an explicit savings clause that provided: "Nothing in this ... [Act] shall
relieve any person from liability at common law or under State statutory law to
any other person." 15 U.S.C. § 4406(c) (1988).
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and the tobacco industry's persuasive preemption argument. Unfortunately, the Court's decision is a hodge-podge of preemptions unlikely to fully satisfy anyone. Plaintiffs have been stripped of their
most promising theory of recovery, that of strict or negligent failure
to warn. 9' The tobacco industry, on the other hand, has been stripped
of preemptive protection against design defect, express warranty, or
intentional tort claims.
Several unusual aspects of the Cipollone decision warrant discussion. First, the Supreme Court's decision, unlike every other reported
case except one, 92 rested on a finding of express-not impliedpreemption.93 Thus, the Court's analysis focused on the intended
scope of the express preemption rather than whether an upset of the
Act's "balance of purposes" would create an actual conflict necessitating implied preemption. 94 The Court's express preemption analysis, inherently dependent-upon semantical nuances, stitched together
what Justice Blackmun described as a "crazy quilt of preemption." 95
Under express preemption analysis, the language of the 1965 Act
was sufficiently narrow that seven justices agreed it did not preempt
failure to warn claims.96 The revised preemption language provided
by the 1969 Act, on the other hand, was, in the eyes of six Justices,
sufficiently broad to indicate an express intent to preempt failure to
warn claims. 9 ' Interestingly, seven Justices also agreed that negligent
research or testing claims were beyond the preemption's tenacles,
provided such claims are unrelated to advertising or promotional
activities.98

91. Perhaps recognizing the futility of proceeding without a failure to warn
theory, Thomas Cipollone voluntarily dismissed with prejudice his remaining claims
on November 5, 1992. "Cipollone Family Drops Landmark Cigarette Suit," WASH.
POST, November 6, 1992 at Bl. The apparent impetus for the dismissal was the
decision by the Cipollone's law firm, Budd, Larner, Gross, Rosenbaum, Greenberg
& Sade, to withdraw from the case. Id. The firm reportedly incurred between
$500,000 and $1 million in expenses pursuing the case. John H. Kennedy, "Suit
Against Tobacco Firms Ends," THE BosToN GLOBE, November 6, 1992 at p.67.
92. Forster v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 423 N.W.2d 691 (Minn. Ct. App.
1988) (federal law provided for express preemption, but scope of such express
preemption does not encompass state common law claims), aff'd in part and rev'd
in part, 437 N.W.2d 655 (Minn. 1989) (en banc). This finding of express preemption
was overruled by the Minnesota Supreme Court, which believed the Act provided
for only implied preemption. Forster, 437 N.W.2d at 660.
93. Cipollone, 112 S.Ct. at 2618.
94. Id. at 2618-20.
95. Id. at 2631. (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
96. Id. at 2619. The seven Justices are Stevens, Rehnquist, White, O'Connor,
Blackmun, Kennedy, and Souter. Justices Scalia and Thomas believed the 1965 Act
did preempt failure to warn claims. Id. at 2635-37.
97. Id. at 2621-22. (Stevens, Rehnquist, White, and O'Connor); see also id.
at 2637 (Scalia and Thomas). Justices Blackmun, Kennedy and Souter believed the
1969 Act did not preempt failure to warn claims. Id. at 2627.
98. Id. at 2622, 2627. Justices Scalia and Thomas believed that both the 1965
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Design defect claims are also beyond the preemptive scope of
both the 1965 and 1969 Acts. 9 While at first blush this may seem
an important victory for plaintiffs, in reality the design defect theory
may not hold much promise in the case of cigarettes. In those states
that have adopted Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, several courts have held that cigarettes are not "unreasonably
dangerous" as a matter of law.' ° ° The root of this position is Section
402A's comment i, which states:
The article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that
contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it with the
ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics ....

Good tobacco is not unreasonably dangerous merely

because the effects of smoking may be harmful; but tobacco containing something like marijuana may be unreasonably dangerous. 01'
Thus, plaintiffs may face the formidable task of establishing that
an ordinary consumer would not have known of the hazards of
cigarette smoking in order to recover under a defective design theory-a task that is virtually impossible given the fact that warning
statements have appeared on every package of cigarettes since January
1, 1966, the effective date of the 1965 Act. 10 2

Act and the 1969 Act preempted negligent testing or research claims. Id. at 263537.
99. Four Justices, Stevens, Rehnquist, White, and O'Connor, while not
explicitly addressing design defect claims, stated that any claim not based on
advertising or promotion would survive preemption. Id. at 2621. Three other Justices,
Blackmun, Kennedy, and Souter, while also not explicitly addressing design defect
claims, expressed a belief that neither the 1965 Act nor the 1969 Act preempted any
common law claims. Id. at 2626-27.
100. See, e.g. Roysdon, 849 F.2d at 236 (under Tennessee law, cigarettes are
not unreasonably dangerous because the amount of information available to public
regarding health hazards associated with smoking in the ten-year period preceding
Plaintiff's complaint precluded existence of a jury question); Hite, 578 A.2d at 421
(plaintiff precluded under Pennsylvania law from pursuing risk-utility design defect
claim because inherent danger of cigarettes were within contemplation of ordinary
consumer), appeal denied, 593 A.2d 842 (Pa. 1991); see also Gunsalus v. Celotex
Corp., 674 F. Supp. 1149, 1158-59 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (applying Pennsylvania law);
cf. Dewey, 577 A.2d at 1253-55 (although current New Jersey law, which includes
comment i, precludes recovery under risk-utility theory against cigarette manufacturer, the law cannot be given retroactive application). But see Kotler v. American
Tobacco Co., 685 F. Supp. 15, 20 (D. Mass. 1988) (whether cigarettes are defective
is a question of fact for the jury), aff'd, 926 F.2d 1217 (1st Cir. 1990), vacated,
112 S. Ct. 3019 (1992); Rogers, 557 N.E.2d at 1053 (under Indiana law, it cannot
be said as a matter of law that tobacco products are insulated from unreasonably
dangerous product categorization under comment i).
101. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment i (1965).
102. Some courts have hinted at a willingness to consider a design defect claim
based upon the theory that a better or safer alternative design was available. See,
e.g., Rogers, 557 N.E.2d at 1053, n.8 ("a design defect which renders the product
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The Supreme Court in Cipollone also left intact plaintiff's theories
of express warranty'0 3 and fraudulent misrepresentation.' ° The Court's
reasoning regarding these claims, however, is a poorly disguised
attempt to pick and choose preemptions that are politically tolerable.
With regard to express warranty, the Court's decision hinged
upon the argument that an express warranty is a voluntary undertaking by the warrantor, not a "requirement or prohibition ...
imposed under State law" within the meaning of subsection (b) of
the 1969 Act's preemption section. 0 5 Justices Scalia and Thomas
took issue with this narrow reading of the preemption language,
arguing that because state law attaches liability to breach of an
express warranty, such liability constitutes a "requirement or prohibition . . .imposed under State law," thereby preempting any claim
based on such breach.
Under Justice Scalia's argument, the fact that a warranty is
voluntarily undertaken is of no consequence.' 6 If the state provides
a remedy, the warranty is transformed into a requirement imposed
under state law, and preemption attaches. Such an argument, though
perhaps logical, leads to absurd consequences. For example, imagine
a cigarette manufacturer as an inducement to use its product, voluntarily promises to pay Smith $100,000 should Smith ever contract
a smoking-related illness. Smith develops a smoking-related illness,
and the cigarette manufacturer refuses to pay as promised. The
cigarette manufacturer's breach of its contractual obligation is clearly
a situation for which state law provides a remedy. Therefore, under
Justice Scalia's argument, the imposition of liability for the contractual breach constitutes a "requirement or prohibition ... imposed
under State law" and Smith's contractual claim is preempted by the
federal law. It seems absurd to believe Congress intended the Act's

more addictive than it could be or addictive when it need not be at all may render
the cigarette unreasonably dangerous in conjunction with its harmful qualities.");
cf. Hite, 578 A.2d at 421 (although risk-utility theory precluded under Pennsylvania
law, question of whether better design theory was viable not reached because plaintiff
did not assert such theory), appeal denied, 593 A.2d 842 (Pa. 1991).
103. All nine Justices agreed that the 1965 Act did not preempt express
warranty claims. Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2622-2626, 2635. With regard to the 1969
Act, however, Justices Scalia and Thomas believed express warranty claims were
preempted. Id. at 2637.
104. As with express warranty, the Court unanimously agreed that the 1965
Act did not preempt fraudulent misrepresentation claims. Id. at 2623-24, 2627, 2635.
Regarding the 1969 Act, however, Justices Scalia and Thomas believed it preempted
fraudulent misrepresentation claims. Id. at 2637.
105. Id. at 2622.
106. Id. at 2635-36. See generally Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 111 S. Ct.
2513, 1527-18 (1991) (promissory estoppel constitutes a "state action" under the
Fourteenth Amendment because it is a legal obligation for which state law provides
a remedy).
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preemption to sweep so broadly. Indeed, as the Minnesota Supreme
Court acknowledged in Forster, such broad interpretation of the
preemption language would effectively give cigarette manufacturers
a "license to lie."'' 0 7 Perhaps because the ramifications of such an
approach would be so unpalatable, a majority of the Court refused
to accept Justice Scalia's argument.
With regard to fraudulent misrepresentation, the pluralityl' s engaged in creative statutory interpretation to hold that the Act did
not preempt such claims because they are not "based on smoking
and health" within the meaning of subsection (b) of the preemption
section.' 9 Rather, the plurality insisted, misrepresentation claims
spring from the more general "duty not to deceive.""10
Such semantical gerrymandering essentially begs the important
policy question of congressional intent. Indeed, under the Court's
reasoning, post-1968 failure to warn claims would likewise not be
preempted because they could be said to spring from the general
duty to adequately inform and are therefore not "based on smoking
and health" within the meaning of the preemption section. The
Court's fleeting emphasis on the "based on smoking and health""'
language smacks of desperation. But employing such narrow construction served two useful purposes. First, it avoided putting the
Court in the uncomfortable position of proclaiming that Congress
intended to allow cigarette manufacturers to escape liability for
intentional misconduct. Second, it allowed the Court to reach an
acceptable conclusion without having to delve into the sticky policy
decisions underlying the language.
Another fascinating aspect of the Cipollone decision is its exclusive reliance on subsection (b) of the preemption section that relates
only to advertising and promotion."12 Although the Court never
acknowledges it, subsection (a) of the preemption section, relating to
cigarette packaging, was left untouched by the 1969 Act amendments."' Thus, an intriguing question arises: What is the preemptive
effect, if any, of subsection (a)?
The Court did provide some helpful hints to answering this
question. The plurality determined that the 1965 Act's preemption

107. Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2635-36.
108. Forster, 437 N.W.2d at 662.
109. It should be noted that three other Justices (Blackmun, Kennedy, and
Souter) believed that fraudulent misrepresentation was not preempted because the
Act did not preempt any common law claims. Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2631.
110. Id. at 2624.
111. Id. at 2617, 2621-24.
112. See supra note 53 for the full text of subsection (b) as amended by the
1969 Act.

113. See supra note 36 for the full text of subsection (a), which has never
been amended by Congress.

TENNESSEE LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 60

language, presumably including both subsections (a) and (b), "only
preempted state and federal rulemaking bodies from mandating particular cautionary statements and did not preempt state law damage
actions."'" 14 In addition, Justices Blackmun, Kennedy, and Souter, in
petitioner's common
a separate opinion," 5 concluded that "none of
6
law claims are preempted by the 1965 Act.""

Thus, it appears that seven Justices agree that subsection (a) does
not preempt any common law causes of action. What, practically
speaking, does this mean? It could mean that a plaintiff could bring
a claim of inadequate warning based solely on the packaging and
such claim would not be preempted. Alternatively, a lower court
faced with a subsection (a) claim could reason that Cipollone is not
of precedential value because it did not directly address subsection
(a)'s preemptive scope. Or perhaps a lower could could even determine that subsection (a) was implicitly repealed by the 1969 Act.
The most reasonable conclusion seems to be that subsection (a)
does not preempt claims based solely on packaging inadequacies. The
repeal by implication argument holds little water because it is apparent that subsections (a) and (b) deal with completely different
situations: subsection (a) deals with packaging while subsection (b)
deals with advertising and promotion. While the two categories
undeniably overlap to some extent, this overlap does not eradicate
the need to address the two issues separately. Indeed, in segregating
packaging preemption from advertising and promotion preemption,
Congress recognized what ordinary people recognize: people often
ignore the puffery associated with cigarette advertisements and promotions. Cigarette packages, on the other hand, are something quite
different. They are the last ditch medium to convey warnings before
the smoker peels away the aluminum foil, plucks the cigarette from
the package, and brings it to his lips. Perhaps the dichotomy in
preemption language between subsections (a) and (b) reflects this
basic understanding.
Indeed, the 1965 Act's original subsection (b) language did not
require any warning statements at all in cigarette ads and promotions.
It was not until the passage of the 1969 Act and its corresponding
change to the language of subsection (b) that the Federal Trade
Commission obtained authority to require warnings in print advertisements."' Thus, while Congress was clearly willing to provide
broader preemption protection for advertising and promotion activities, it indicated that it was not willing to do so for packaging when
it refused to amend subsection (a) in 1969.

114.

Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2619 (emphasis added).

115.

Id. at 2625 (concurring in part and dissenting in part).

116. Id. at 2626 (emphasis added).

117. Id.at 2617. See also Inre Lorillard, 80 F.T.C. 455 (1972).
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The apparent differential treatment in preemptive scope between
packaging and advertising and promotion could plausibly reflect
Congress' understanding that its statutorily prescribed package warnings, though adequate at the time the law was passed, would not
remain adequate as scientific knowledge expanded. State tort law
would, therefore, continue to play a large role in performing the
adequacy assessement. The broader preemptive protection afforded
advertising and promotional activities, on the other hand, was an
indication of congressional confidence in the FTC as the exclusive
watchdog for fraudulent advertisements and promotions."l 8
Whatever the explanation for the disparate treatment of packaging
preemption and advertising and promotion preemption, the Supreme
Court in Cipollone did not even acknowledge its existence. Failure
to do so leaves many questions unanswered, the most significant of
which is the preemptive scope of subsection (a). Given, however, the
broad language in Cipollone regarding the lack of preemptive effect
of the 1965 Act, plaintiffs' attorneys would be well advised to
consider subsection (a) in crafting their complaints.
Perhaps the most intriguing aspect of the Cipollone decision is
found not in what the Court said, but in what the decision says
about Congress and things to come. Congress sat silently on the
sidelines 4s the courts grappled with the complex policy issues raised
by Cipollone and its sister cases. Congress could have chosen to
amend the Act and clarify its intent. Instead, it chose to let the
judicial branch do its dirty work, foisting upon the courts the tough
policy decisions it could not-or would not-make itself. The result
of Congress' "pass the buck" mentality is Cipollone, a decision
perhaps best described as judicial pin-the-tail-on-the-donkey policymaking.
The judicial branch should not be the dumping ground of misfit
federal laws. Given the growing use of preemption as an affirmative
defense in areas of federal involvement, Congress can now be irrefutably presumed to know the importance of addressing this issue
explicitly. Assuming, however, that Congress continues to take the
path of silence or ambiguity, what are the courts to make of such
silence or ambiguity? Or more precisely, which is to be the more
reasonable inference-that silence or ambiguity evinces an intent to
preempt, or that silence or ambiguity evinces an intent not to
preempt?
The answer to this question necessarily depends on the courts'
deference to states' rights and, ultimately, what courts think the
118. The 1965 Act conferred upon the FTC the authority to regulate "unfair
or deceptive acts or practices in the advertising of cigarettes." 15 U.S.C. § 1336
(1988). It also required the FTC to make annual reports and recommendations on
the effectiveness of cigarette labeling and current practices in cigarette advertising
and promotion. 15 U.S.C. § 1337 (1988).
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"burden of revelation" should be. The Cipollone decision indicates
that the present Supreme Court believes Congress bears a heavy
burden of revelation. Congress therefore bears the burden of revealing
an intent not to do X, rather than simply bearing the burden of
revealing an intent to do X. If Congress wishes to preserve common
law claims in the future, it had better unambiguously provide a
savings clause.
Whether Congress should fairly have to bear this burden is
debatable. Certainly from the standpoint of legislative economy,
requiring Congress to provide a laundry list of the things legislation
was not intended to do is inefficient. But it is largely a burden that
has been self-imposed: Congress' inability to make tough policy
decisions has forced the courts to make these decisions for it.
Cipollone may well mark the beginning of a new era of judicial
activism by default, producing half-hearted political compromises,
devoid of policy.
Elizabeth C. Price
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Appendix A
Preemptive Scope of Federal Cigarette Labeling and
Advertising Act
Cipollone v. LigA)ett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608
(1992)
pre-1969

post-1968'

A. Strict Liability

not preempted

preempted (if
based on advertising or promotion)

B. Negligent

not preempted

preempted (if
based on advertising or promotion)

C. Neutralization

not preempted

preempted (if
based on advertising or promotion)

Negligent Research
or Testing

not preempted

not preempted
(if not based on
advertising or
promotion)

III. Express Warranty

not preempted

not preempted

IV. Fraudulent
Misrepresentation

not preempted

not preempted

V.

not preempted

not preempted

not preempted

not preempted

I.

II.

Failure to Warn

Conspiracy to
Misrepresent

VI. Design or
Manufacturing Defect

1. The effective date of the preemption section of the 1969 Act is July 1,
1969. Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222, 84 Stat.
87, 90 (1970).
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